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PRACTICING WHAT WE PREACH: HUMANE TREATMENT FOR
DETAINEES IN THE WAR ON TERROR
JENNIFER MOORE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

As human beings we do not lose our legal and human personality because we
are suspected of links to terrorism. We remain entitled to freedom from arbitrary
detention, torture and inhuman treatment at all times and in all situations. In
leading the so-called "war on terror," however, the United States is honoring these
principles in the breach, as witnessed by the treatment of Jose Padilla, Yaser
Hamdi, Shafiq Rasul, Mullah Habibullah, Mr. Dilawar and other terror suspects
apprehended in the United States, Afghanistan and Iraq. The mistreatment of these
individuals has occurred against a backdrop of repeated misstatements of law by
the Bush administration that suspected terrorists may not look to the Convention
Against Torture or the Geneva Conventions for protection.' Despite using the
language of war to characterize its response to acts of terrorism, the United States
has sidelined the international law of war in its treatment of suspected.terrorists.
In seeking fair treatment for persons detained on suspicion of involvement in
terrorism, we must clarify at the outset our use of certain essential terms.
"Terrorism" and "terror," in this analysis, refer to calculated incidents of violence
specifically targeting civilians. 2 The "war on terror," or the campaign against
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1. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Department of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct
for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, (Aug. 1, 2002) at pt. 1iB, 20-23 [hereinafter Bybee
memo],
available
at.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf;
Id. at pt. IVA, 27-30. See also
Memorandum from Albert R. Gonzales, White House Legal Counsel, to the President: Decision re
Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the
Taliban,
(Jan.
25,
2002)
at
2
[hereinafter
Gonzales
memo],
available
at
htt?.//msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/site/newsweek.
2. In early 2005, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for a definition of terrorism "as
[encompassing] any act 'intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants'
aimed at intimidating governments, populations or international organizations." Warren Hoge, Annan
to Offer Plans for Change in U.N. Structure, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 2005 at Al, 7 (citing In Larger
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terrorism, comprises systematic responses to terrorism, both lawful and unlawful,
and whether military, paramilitary or police actions. "Detainees" are individuals
apprehended on suspicion of involvement in acts of terrorism, especially those who
have not been accorded prisoner of war status, nor charged with specific crimes,
nor accorded judicial process prior to during prolonged detention.3
While terrorism is often associated with non-state actors, and the war on
terror most often with counter-terrorism measures that engage the military and4
of actors.
police power of the state, neither use of force is confined to one set
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (United Nations 2005)). The
Secretary General then put the issue of terrorism on the agenda of the upcoming World Summit
convened by the U.N. General Assembly in September 2005.
The issue of combating global terrorism figured prominently at the World Summit. Two
resolutions on terrorism were adopted, one by the Security Council during the Summit, and another by
the General Assembly subsequently. The Security Council "[c]ondemn[ed] in the strongest terms all
acts of terrorism irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed, as one of
the most serious threats to peace and security .... " UNSC Res. 1624 (2005), 14 September 2005,
SIRES/1624. The General Assembly "[a]ffirm[ed] that states must ensure that any measure taken to
combat terrorism complies with all their obligations under international law . . . in particular
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law" and stressed "the need to enhance the role of
the United Nations ...

in combating international terrorism . . . and to . . . strengthen international

cooperation to prevent and suppress effectively international terrorism in all its forms and
UNGA Res. 60/43, 6 January 2006, A/RES/60/43.
manifestations ....
The definition of terrorism under the U.S. Code focuses on the political motivations and
civilian targets of the violence. Under the U.S. Foreign Relations Act, "the term 'terrorism' means
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents." See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2656(f)(d)(2) (2005). However, unlike S.G. Annan's
definition, the U.S. definition of terrorism is limited to non-state agents. See id. See also 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2005) (including under "terrorist activity" hijacking, assassination, use of dangerous
device, etc.); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332(a) (2005) (criminalizing use of weapon of mass destruction);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft , art. l(a), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (criminalizing conduct whereby "[a] person.., on board an aircraft in flight..
unlawfully, by force or threat thereof ... seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft... ").
Washington Post journalist Steve Coil emphasizes two aspects of terrorism, its typically
spectacular means and its often nationalistic ends. He refers to modem terrorism as "theater invented
largely by a stateless Palestinian diaspora whose leftist leaders sought dramatic means to attract
attention to their national claims." See STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE
CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 138

(Penguin Books 2004). In focusing on terrorist attacks in the mid 1980's, Cole emphasizes that
Some of these groups
"[s]ecular leftist groups carried out the most visible terrorist strikes ....
advocated a nationalist cause - the Palestinian terrorists, the Irish Republican Army, the Basque
separatists." Id. at 142.
3. The term detainee also has a much broader application to individuals whose liberty is limited
for a variety of reasons and under various authorities. Examples are individuals jailed pending trial on
criminal charges, who are generally referred to as "criminal defendants"; individuals imprisoned after
trial and a finding of guilt, who are deemed "convicted persons"; and soldiers encamped by the military
authority of another belligerent power, who are called "prisoners of war." What sets detainees in the
war on terror apart from other classes of detainees is that typically they lack the legal protections
associated with either military or criminal prisoners. Unlike recognized combatants, they do not enjoy
POW status. And unlike criminal defendants or convicts, they enjoy no presumption of innocence, nor
may they present a defense or confront their accusers in a court of law. For this reason, terrorismrelated detainees are particularly vulnerable to arbitrary treatment.
4. See generally, Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International Protection
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Nevertheless, in confronting and evaluating the treatment of detainees in the
current U.S.-led war on terror, this article will be focusing on action taken by the
U.S. government against individuals suspected of involvement in targeted acts of
violence against civilians in the United States, Afghanistan and Iraq. The temporal
context of this analysis is the period beginning on September 11, 2001, when
several thousand civilians were killed in the al Qaeda bombings of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. The counter-terrorism policies of the United
Kingdom in the 1970's and Israel in the 1990's will also provide important
historical comparisons.
This article sets forth both principled and pragmatic arguments for the fair and
humane treatment of all individuals detained in the war on terror derived from both
U.S. and international law. Section II explores the human dimension of the "war
on terror." Section IIA critiques the use of the metaphor of war to characterize
counter-terrorism policy. Section 1iB examines the experiences of several
individuals apprehended by the United States on suspicion of involvement in
terrorism, including the response of U.S. courts to their detention without charge as
"unlawful combatants."
Section III offers possible explanations for the
phenomenon by which the United States and other nations denounce terror on the
one hand, while engaging in torture, inhuman treatment and arbitrary detention of
suspected terrorists on the other. Finally, Section IV explores and seeks to identify
and define the abiding and universal norms of humane treatment, freedom from
torture and due process as evidenced in the Geneva Conventions, the Convention
Against Torture, contemporary social commentary, human rights advocacy and
scholarly analysis. While official U.S. policy on torture has evolved closer to
international standards in recent months, actual practice remains grossly violative
of norms of humane treatment, and no senior government official has taken
responsibility or been charged with criminal conduct in any detainee abuse case.
In witnessing our collective failure to stop ongoing abuses of detainees by U.S.
officials, this article ends with a call to action.
Both respect for the human dignity of individuals and enlightened self-interest
on the part of governments lead us to a similar conclusion. Responses to terrorism,
like the phenomenon of terrorism itself, cannot be immune from the rule of law,
because in the face of catastrophic acts of violence against civilians, we have a
heightened need for the protections that law and humanitarian principles provide.

from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv.

81-121 (1999)

(discussing state and non-state agents of persecution and human rights abuses). But see 22 U.S.C.A. §
2656f(d)(2) (2005) (limiting terrorism to violence by "subnational or clandestine groups").
When we understand that acts of terrorism can be state-sponsored as well as private, and,
similarly, that non-state agents as well as governments undertake counter-terror responses, certain
troubling tendencies of the war on terror are unveiled. Terror and the arbitrary use of power lead to
more violence and arbitrariness, in a cycle that threatens human life and dignity as well as the rule of
law, and is very difficult to control.
Steve Coll explores the linkages and ironies between state-funded and non-state-subsidized
violence. COLL, supra note 2. He examines in particular CIA support for counter-Soviet insurgents in
Afghanistan in the 1980's, and the subsequent global proliferation of terrorist groups and tactics,
beginning in the 1990's and continuing to play itself out today. See id. at 330.
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It is the framework of law that protects government actors and the citizens they
represent from becoming part of the very cycle of violence and illegality that we
all confront.
II.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE WAR ON TERROR

A. The "War on Terror"
The "war on terror" is a misleading term, if not a misnomer, given that
classically wars are fought against armed forces composed of individuals, whether
affiliated with governments, factions, insurgencies or more loosely organized
bands of combatants. Certainly the term "war" has historically been used
metaphorically, as in the "war on poverty," the "war on hunger," and the "war on
AIDS." But unlike the war on terror, those campaigns have predominantly used
national social programs, private and international philanthropy, and fiscal policy
to alleviate socio-economic suffering. Contrastingly, the war on terror, like more
traditional wars, relies primarily on the use of force, whether by the military or by
law enforcement officials. But here the military model breaks down. In most
military, paramilitary and police actions, the enemy is a group of individuals,
where in the war on terror, the enemy is a phenomenon.
War, it has been said, empowers combatants "to kill people and break things."
Terror, or the targeted use of violence against civilians, cannot be killed or
broken.' It is the suspected terrorists and the communities in which they reside
that can be killed and broken. Thus, the war on terror is more accurately
conceived as a military, paramilitary and law enforcement campaign against
suspected terrorists and the states and communities believed to shelter and support
them.
It is at least ironic that the U.S. government has taken the position that
humanitarian law, or the law regulating the conduct of warfare, does not apply to
the "war on terror." Fundamentally, if we are to affirm the humanity and legal
personality of suspected terrorists, we must first acknowledge their extra-judicial
treatment, and then seek to resurrect the rule of law in our campaign against
terrorism.
B. The Suspected Terrorists
Official pronouncements, judicial decisions, media coverage and public
discourse all influence the impact of terror and the course of counter-terrorism
measures. But if we are to honestly take on the reality of terrorism and counterterrorism, we must confront the impact that the war on terror has had on particular
human beings implicated in this conflict. Cases brought on behalf of several of
these individuals have given U.S. courts the opportunity to begin re-imposing the
rule of law on the government of the United States.

5. Retired U.S. Army General William Odom has stated that "[t]errorism is not any enemy. It
cannot be defeated. It's a tactic. It's about as sensible to say we declare war on night attacks and
suspect we're going to win that war." See Norman Solomon, Terrorism, "The War on Terror" and the
Message
of
Carnage, TRUTHOUT
PERSPECTIVE,
July
9,
2005, available at
http://www.truthout.org/docs.2005/printer_070905X.shtml.
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Two individuals identified with the war on terror at home in the United States
were U.S. citizens suspected of involvement in terrorism, who were detained
without charge for prolonged periods. Yaser Esam Hamdi was apprehended in
Afghanistan and detained without charge in the United States as a suspected
Taliban fighter until the U.S. Supreme Court declared in 2004 that he was entitled
to challenge his detention in court,6 at which time U.S. authorities returned him to
his native Saudi Arabia. 7 Jose Padilla, the so-called "dirty bomber," was
apprehended in 2000 at O'Hare Airport in Chicago, and was detained without
charge until November, 2005, despite the Second Circuit Court of Appeals'
rejection of the Bush administration's authority to detain him as an "enemy
combatant."8 As of February, 2006, the Supreme Court is considering Padilla's
second petition for certiorari, and the United States has recently indicted him on
lesser charges. 9
In Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the faces of the war on terror include Shafiq Rasul
and other suspected Taliban and al Qaeda operatives detained without charge until
the U.S. Supreme Court declared they were entitled to hearings to determine their
status as POWs, irregular combatants or civilians. 10 In Iraq, a faceless, hooded
6. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 601 (2004) ("We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee
seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis
for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertion before a neutral
decision maker.").
7. David Stout, U.S. Agrees to Release American Caught with Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2004,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/22/politics/22CNDHAMD.html?ex=l 129089600&en=cb4aa38581 b80dcd&ei=5070&hp.
8. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003) ("... in the domestic context, the
President's inherent constitutional powers do not extend to the detention as an enemy combatant of an
American seized within the country away from a zone of combat; [and] the Non-Detention Act
prohibits the detention of American citizens without express Congressional authorization").
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and determined that the case should have been filed
in South Carolina rather than New York. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). The U.S. District
Court for the District of South Carolina agreed with the Second Circuit that there was no legal basis for
Padilla's military detention. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2005). The District
Court ordered that Padilla be released within 45 days unless criminal charges were brought. Id. at 692.
9. On November 17, 2005, days before the deadline for the government's reply to Padilla's
second petition to the Supreme Court, Attorney General Gonzales announced an indictment against
Padilla on charges of providing material aid to terrorists, but not with membership in al Qaeda or
involvement in a plot to detonate a dirty bomb. The administration's indictment of Padilla, and
attempts to transfer him from military to criminal custody, are regarded to be motivated by a desire to
render moot Padilla's appeal to the Supreme Court, and to let stand the Fourth Circuit's determination
that his detention without charge was constitutional. See Adam Liptak, In Terror Cases, Administration
Sets Own Rules, N.Y.TIMES, November 27, 2005. On January 4, 2006, the Supreme Court granted the
government's motion to transfer Padilla from military custody to the warden of a federal detention
center in Florida to face criminal charges contained in the November 17, 2005 indictment. The Court
indicated that Padilla's petition for certiorari remained under consideration. Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S.Ct.
978 (Mem.) (2006).
10. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 563 (2004) ("[w]e therefore hold that [28 U.S.C.] § 2241 confers
on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their
detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base."); But see Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp. 2d 311, 318-19
(D.C. Cir. 2005). (Judge Leon held that Congress, through its Authorization for Use of Military Force,
authorized the President to "capture and detain those who the military determined were either
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man and his fellow inmates have come to personify the war on terror, as their
pictures made infamous the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib detention center. This group of
prisoners suffered many forms of torture and inhuman treatment at the hands of
U.S. military personnel, including sleep and food deprivation, stress positions,
beatings, simulated drowning, sexual abuse and humiliation.11 Private Charles A.
responsible for the 9/11 attacks or posed a threat of future terrorist attacks.") See also id. at 321.
("[n]on-resident aliens, captured in foreign territory and held . .. outside sovereign United States
territory... possess no cognizable constitutional rights.").
Subsequently, in January 2005, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green found that U.S.
military tribunal proceedings in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba violated both constitutional and international
law. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d 443, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See Gonzales,
supra note 1. At trial, Judge Green denounced "shocking examples of torture used to extract
confessions abroad." See Jonathan Turley, A Check on Wartime Power, NAT'L L. J., March 7, 2005;
But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40-43 (D.C. Cir. 2005). ("[w]e therefore hold that the 1949
Geneva Convention [re POWs] does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its provisions in court")
and ("[w]e therefore see no reason why Hamdan could not assert his claim to prisoner of war status
before the military commission at the time of his trial and thereby receive the judgment of a 'competent
tribunal'). The D.C. Circuit Court overruled the D.C. District Court's prior invalidation of war crimes
trials by military commissions. Id. at 43.
In November 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hamdan. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S.Ct. 622 (Mem.), No. 05-184 (granted November 7, 2005). The Court will consider the
constitutionality of the military commissions as well as Hamdan's claims under the Geneva
Conventions. Hamdan's Supreme Court case is complicated by a recent amendment to the U.S. habeas
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.A. 2241, enacted through the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal
Year 2006, and popularly known as the Detainee Treatment Act. Pursuant to section 1405(e)(2)(A) of
this Act, judicial review of the detention of enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Iraq and
Afghanistan must be sought in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The D.C. Circuit's exclusive
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing convictions handed down by the military commissions, and
determining whether detainees have been properly designated enemy combatants by the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. 109163, § 1405, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006). The U.S. government is arguing that section 1405 moots all
pending habeas actions filed by Guantanamo Bay detainees, including Mr. Hamdan. See Brief for
Respondents on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit at 12, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2006).
11. Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, Dogs and Other Harsh Tactics Linked to Military Intelligence,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at Al. See also, Seymour M. Hersch, The Gray Zone: How a Secret
Pentagon ProgramCame to Abu Ghraib,THE NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004, at 38-44; Susan Sontag,
What Have We Done, THE GUARDIAN, May 24, 2004; Neil Lewis & Eric Lichtblau, Red Cross Says
that for Months It Complained of Iraq Prison Abuses to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES , May 7, 2004, at AI0;
Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an internaleffort to ban the abuse and torture of detainees was thwarted,
THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006 at 32-41 (relating former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mom's
response to U.S. prisoner abuse and his attempts to promote U.S. interrogation policy consistent with
U.S. and international law).
In May 2004, the U.S. Army released a report prepared by Major General Antonio M. Taguba
on alleged abuses of prisoners by U.S. military police (MP) and military intelligence (MI) personnel in
Iraq. The executive summary of the report is available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4894001.
General Taguba concluded that "[s]everal Army soldiers have committed egregious acts and grave
breaches of international law at the Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq" during the August 2003
to February 2004 period, including "numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal
abuses" inflicted on detainees. See Taguba report, Conclusion, par. I and Part I, Findings of Fact,
para. 5. However, while General Taguba found that "key senior leaders in both the 8 0 0 h MP Brigade
and the 2 0 5 1h Ml Brigade failed to comply with established regulations, policies and commend
directives in preventing detainee abuse" he recommended no disciplinary action against Lieutenant

2006

PRACTICING WHAT WE PREACH

Graner, Jr., a military police officer (MP) and the declared ringleader of abusive
MP's at Abu Ghraib, was convicted of criminal conduct and several other MP's
have plead guilty to various charges of abuse. More recently, in July of 2005,
eleven U.S. soldiers were charged with abusing detainees in Iraq, and their
12
company has been taken off active duty pending the investigation. Nevertheless,
in the detainee
charged
been
U.S. military or civilian official has
to date no senior
13
abuse scandal.

Finally, in Afghanistan, among the most tragic faces of the war on terror are
those of Mullah Habibullah and a 22-year-old taxi driver named Mr. Dilawar, who
both died in December 2002 from beatings by U.S. military personnel at Bagram
Control Point. 14 Much of what we now know about the deaths of Habibullah and
Dilawar comes from a nearly 2000-page confidential Army criminal investigation
5
file that was obtained by New York Times reporter Tim Golden.
Golden's May 2005 analysis of the Army report recounts extensive testimony
by Army interrogators and guards that both men were subjected to stress positions
prior to and during interrogation sessions, and that Habibullah was chained to the
ceiling of his cell. While interrogators admitted to beating Habibullah perhaps a
dozen times, Mr. Dilawar was struck on the legs as many as 100 times, such that
the Army coroner who conducted his autopsy described his legs as "pulpified."
The Army found probable cause to charge 27 officers and soldiers in the death of
Mr. Dilawar, fifteen of whom were also implicated in Habibullah's death. By
January 2006, only fifteen soldiers and one officer had been charged in the beating
deaths of Dilawar and Habibullah. In that same month, the Army dropped its case
against Military Police Captain Christopher Beiring, based on the recommendation
of an investigating judge.16
General Ricardo Sanchez, then the senior U.S. military official in Iraq. Compare id., Part Ill, Findings
of Fact, para. 22, with id., Conclusion, para. 1.
12. Kirk Semple, Suicide Bomber Ignites Tanker, Killing 59 Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005 at
Al.
13. Josh White, Abu Ghraib Tactics Were First Used at Guantanamo,WASH POST, July 14, 2005
at Al.
Professor Jordan Paust of the University of Houston Law Center has thoroughly analyzed the series of
memoranda and policy directives prepared and promulgated by legal counsel and senior officials in the
Departments of Justice, State and Defense with respect to the treatment of U.S. detainees in the war on
terror. He concludes that U.S. lawyers and high-ranking governmental officials were involved in "plans
to deny protections under the Geneva Conventions to persons detained during the armed conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq." See Jordan Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International
Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogationof Detainees,43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 861; see
generally id. at 811-863.
14. See Douglas Jehl, Army Details Scale of Abuse of Prisonersin an Afghan Jail,N.Y. TIMES,
March 12, 2005, at Al.
15. Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of Two Afghan Inmates' Deaths, N.Y. TIMES
May 20, 2005, at Al.
16. Id. See also Tim Golden, Abuse Inquiry Bogged Down in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
2005, at Al, 16; Tim Golden, Case Dropped Against U.S. Officer in Beating Deaths of Afghan Inmates,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006 at 13 (indicating that in the sixteen cases involving Army personnel originally
charged in the deaths of Dilawar and Habibullah, there have been three dismissals, four acquittals, six
guilty pleas and one conviction of assault and related charges; one trial has been scheduled, and one
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We cannot evaluate U.S. counter-terrorism policy on political, legal or moral
grounds without recognizing the humanity of those persons targeted by terror and
counter-terror alike. Perhaps the most troubling characteristic of the U.S. response
to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq is the extent to which the personhood of suspected terrorists has been
denied, whether their legal personality and their access to the courts or their rights
to life, humane treatment and freedom from torture. While federal courts are
beginning to challenge its authority, the Bush administration has both expressly
and by implication, at home and abroad, declared that individuals suspected of
involvement in terrorism are outside the bounds of the Geneva Conventions of
1949," 7 the 1984 Convention Against Torture, 18 and the U.S. Constitution itself.
Understanding why and how the United States and other governments have taken
this extra-legal approach to counter-terrorism is the first step in reconstructing the
rule of law in the struggle against terror.
III. HYPOCRISY IN STATE POLICIES REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF TERROR
SUSPECTS

There are two related tendencies whereby states denounce violence and terror
yet violate the human rights of individuals apprehended in the war on terror. The
first involves hypocrisy between ends and means, whereby states seek to justify
repressive methods in service of a purportedly just cause. Thus, states decry the
indiscriminate killing of civilians by non-state agents, with principled reference to
criminal law, human rights law or international humanitarian law. However, they
then link this denunciation of terrorism with the promotion of strong-handed
interrogation tactics, if not torture itself, which they claim will result in intelligence
vital to preventing future terrorist attacks. In the United States, such mixed
messages helped to cultivate an extremely permissive environment which led to
the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib, Bagram and other U.S. detention centers in
Iraq and Afghanistan.19
The second type of hypocrisy involves the classic gap between de jure rules
and defacto practices relating to torture: the state denounces torture officially, but
its agents practice torture or inhuman treatment with state awareness, acquiescence
or encouragement, if not outright instructions on the part of the military and

additional charge is pending).
17. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. See also Gonzales
memorandum, supra note 1 (stating that Taliban and al Qaeda members are ineligible for prisoner of
war status).
18. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. See also Bybee
memorandum, supra note 1, at I (torture defined as the infliction of "pain ... equivalent to intensity to
the pain accompanying serious ... organ failure ... or even death").

19. Hersch, supra note II. See also Mayer, supra note I1, at 39-40.
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civilian leadership. In recent years this official denial of the actual practice of
2
20
torture has characterized countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Peru 1 and the
United States.22
These two related but distinct inconsistencies in state treatment of detainees in
the war on terror will be examined in turn. With regard to the terror vs. torture
divide, the focus will be on why states seem to justify torture, while denouncing
terror. With regard to the gap between principle and practice, the focus will be on
how states seek to rationalize the practice of torture despite laws explicitly
forbidding it.
A. Why States Denounce Terror but Permit Torture
To understand why state officials can engage in the inhuman treatment and
torture of individuals suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism, we should not
limit our analysis to those authoritarian countries often regarded as the chief
violators of civil and political rights. In fact, perhaps the more revealing cases are
those of liberal democracies with strong records overall in upholding norms of due
process and fair treatment, civilian control of the military and judicial review.
Over the past thirty years, the United Kingdom, Israel and the United States have
each experienced organized acts of terrorism linked to extremist wings of militant
organizations, and have responded with counter-terrorism policies that have been
challenged in the courts.
The U.K. response to Irish Republican Army attacks on civilians has had
repercussions for non-violent participants in the Irish nationalist movement, both
within and outside the IRA.23 By the same token, Israel's efforts to stop Hamas
and Islamic Jihad suicide bomb attacks in Israel, Gaza and the West Band have
reverberated on moderate members of Palestinian nationalist organizations and
apolitical Palestinians alike.24 Finally, in the United States, discreet acts of
20. Human Rights Watch World Report 2003: Events of 2002, (Human Rights Watch, New York,
N.Y.), 2003, at 474 (documenting "torture under interrogation of political prisoners and criminal
suspects [in Saudi Arabia]"), availableat http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/pdf/isotpa.pdf.
21. Id. at 161 ("torture remained a serious problem [in Peru].... A law introduced in 1998
explicitly outlawing torture made little impact").
22. See generally, Human Rights Watch, Getting Away With Torture? Command Responsibility
For the U.S. Abuse of Detainees (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), April, 2005, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/. See also Maggie Farley, Report: U.S. Is Abusing Captives,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006 at Al (White House spokesman Scott McClellan responded to a 2006 report
by five U.N.-appointed independent experts that torture of detainees is occurring in Guantanamo Bay:
"the President has made it very clear that we do not condone torture and we do not engage in torture").
23. See RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS
OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 693 (Little, Brown & Co. 1995) (This passage synopsizes the U.K.
response to IRA terrorism in the 1970's, including internment without trial of IRA suspects beginning
in 1971, and direct rule by the U.K. from 1972. The authors introduce the Ireland v. United Kingdom
case, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1980), [decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 1977], in which
the government of Ireland charged U.K. Army and constabulary officials with arbitrary arrest and
torture of detainees).
24. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 19, at 459. ("Civilians increasingly paid the price for
repeated, egregious violations of international humanitarian law by the Israel Defense Force [IDP] and
Palestinian armed groups.")
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violence linked to the al Qaeda organization in the 1990's and 2001 have had a
negative impact on the treatment of Moslem and Arab citizens and residents of the
United States and other countries.25
In the case of the U.K. and Israel, military and paramilitary forces linked to
the governments have also carried out violent acts resulting in the deaths of
civilians. Moreover, militant groups in both the U.K./Northem Ireland and
Israel/Palestine are radical offshoots of much broader nationalist movements that
include groups and individuals that denounce violence in all forms.
It may be illuminating to focus on the situations facing the United Kingdom
in the 1970's, Israel in the 1990's and the United States since 2001, as examples of
the responses of liberal democratic governments to both the reality of terrorist
attacks and the politics of terrorism and counter-terrorism. In the 1970's, the
United Kingdom experienced an intense period of non-violent and violent
opposition to British rule in Northern Ireland, including a series of IRA bombings
that led to many civilian deaths. UK authorities responded by arresting large
numbers of suspected IRA operatives and their family members. Suspects in
custody were subjected to detention without trial and the so-called "five
techniques," which included wall standing, hooding, subjection to noise, sleep
deprivation and deprivation of food and drink. 6 The Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC), UK police responsible for Northern Ireland, attempted to justify these
techniques as necessary to derive evidence regarding planned terrorist attacks and
to stop such operations.
The five techniques subsequently became the subject of public condemnation,
internal review within the RUC and legal challenges, finally resulting in an action
brought by the Republic of Ireland against the U.K. in the European Court of
Human Rights. In 1978, the European Court found that the five techniques, while
not amounting to torture, did constitute violations of the non-derogable norm of
humane treatment, and therefore the U.K. was deemed in violation of Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.27 The
Court clarified that inhuman treatment is never justified, even in time of national
emergency.28
In Israel in the 1990's, suspected Palestinian militants in custody were
subjected to detention without trial and coercive interrogation measures, including
shaking, binding and hooding ("Shabach"), the "Frog Crouch," excessive
tightening of handcuffs, and sleep deprivation. 29 As in the earlier case of Northern
Ireland, these measures were offered as purportedly legitimate means of

25. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 22.
26. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 at 59 (1978).
27. Id. at 80 (citing, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3,213 U.N.T.S. 222).
28. Id.
29. See Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism Within the Law (citing HCJ
5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, 9-13 [hereinafter Pub.
Comm. v. Israel), availableat http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/sctterror.html.
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responding to "ticking time bombs, ' 30 and hence necessary to stop the deaths of
civilians. In 1999, the Israeli Supreme Court denied the government's authority to
3
engage in such acts, and clarified that torture is illegal under Israeli law. '
Justice Barak, the President of the Israel Supreme Court, authored the opinion
in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel. His decision
rejected the charge that using lawful means might handicap the state in its fight
against terror. "A democracy," he wrote, "must sometimes fight with one hand tied
behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and
the liberty of an individual constitute important components in its understanding of
security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it
,,32
to overcome its difficulties.
The United States, unlike the U.K. or Israel, has not experienced sustained
insurgency or the occupation of contiguous territory for over 100 years. Thus
when several thousand civilians were killed in the 2001 al Qaeda attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, these attacks were perceived in part as a
wake-up call to the ongoing threat of terrorist violence in the United States. Other
observers view terrorism as a criminal expression of opposition to U.S. economic,
foreign and military policy abroad,33 pointing in particular to the gap between U.S.
democratic values and our nation's support for non-democratic regimes in the
Middle East and South Asia or to our ongoing military occupation of Iraq itself.
Robert Pape's research on terrorist violence over a twenty-three year period
reveals that the majority of such violent attacks against civilians are carried out not
by religious fundamentalists, but by secular organizations opposed to military and
34
Whether
economic domination by liberal democratic governments.
fundamentalist or secular in nature, these organizations share opposition to foreign
intervention and occupation. Consistent with Pape's analysis, and focusing on the
phenomenon of increasing terrorist attacks in Iraq, retired General Gregory
Neubold has stated, "[w]e have to understand that the fundamental reason for
insurgency, the thing that35ties all the various groups together, is their view that we
are an occupying power."

30. Pub. Comm. v. Israel, supra note 29, at 34.
31. Id. at 77 9-13; id. at ,23 (", . . a reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture
[and] free of cruel, inhuman treatment . . . This conclusion is in perfect accord with (various)
International Law treaties - to which Israel is a signatory - which prohibit the use of torture, 'cruel,
inhuman treatment' and 'degrading treatment' .... )
32. Id. at 139.
33. In a recent report on reform of the United Nations system, Kofi Annan states that "[w] must
convince all those who may be tempted to support terrorism that it is neither an acceptable nor an
effective way to advance their cause." See Hoge, supra note 2 (citing In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rightsfor All (United Nations March 2005)).
34. Robert Pape, Blowing Up an Assumption, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005 at A23. ("What nearly
all suicide terrorist attacks actually have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel
modem democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their
homeland.") See generally, ROBERT PAPE, DYING To WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE
TERRORISM (University of Chicago Press 2005).
35. Senator Barbara Boxer, Iraq: Credibility, Responsibility, Accountability, Remarks at the
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Since 2001, over 1200 people have been arrested and detained in the United
States on suspicion of connection to the events of September 11, and over 82,000
young men from 25 Middle Eastern and South Asian countries have been subjected
to a Special Registration program.36 Since January 11, 2002, approximately 750
suspected al Qaeda or Taliban members have been detained without charge at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,37 and selected individuals have been detained without
charge as "unlawful" or "enemy combatants" in U.S. jails and military brigs.
Unknown numbers of terror suspects have been detained and mistreated in dozens
of U.S. detention centers around the world, including Abu Ghraib and Bagram. In
Iraq alone, approximately 10,000 long-term detainees are being held in Abu
Ghraib prison and Camp Bucca as of April 2005.38
In the few years since 2001, the U.S. treatment of suspected "unlawful
combatants" in the war on terror has also led to internal debate and criticism by the
public and the courts, analogous in many ways to earlier political and judicial
developments in the United Kingdom and Israel. In the Hamdi, Padillaand Rasul
cases, U.S. courts, notably the Supreme Court in Hamdi and Rasul, have denied the
government's authority to detain suspected terrorists outside the bounds of the
Constitution and federal court review. 39 However, more recently, in the Hamdan
case, a U.S. circuit court upheld the legality of military commissions to determine

Commonwealth
Club
(July
6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.truthout.org/docs 2005/printer 071005A.shtml.
36. Michael Posner, National Security After September 1l: A Rights Perspective, Remarks
Presented to the American Bar Foundation (Feb. 7, 2004). See also, Muzaffar A. Chishti et al.,
America's Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Unity After September 11
(Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.), 2003, at 9, 12.
37. Timeline of Legal and JudicialEvents Related to Guantanamo Bay, MIAMI HERALD, April 7,
2005,
available
at
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/special-packages/archive/1 1276706.htm?template=cont
entModules/printstory.jsp.
Gradually, the U.S. government has released significant numbers of the Guantanamo
detainees, conceding they had limited "intelligence value," such that by February 2004, only 650
remained in Cuba. Posner, supra note 36, at 4. As of March 29, 2005, the International Committee of
the Red Cross estimates that 540 detainees remain in Guantanamo, from around 40 countries. U.S.
Detention Related to the Events of I I September 2001 and its Aftermath - the Role of the ICRC (ICRC,
Geneva,
Switzerland),
2004,
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/6CPK3 V?OpenDocument.
38. Human Rights Watch, supra note 22, at 13 (documenting cases of torture and torture-related
trauma and deaths of security-related detainees in U.S. custody around the world). See Doug Smith &
Raheem Salman, The Conflict in Iraq; Long Jailings Anger Iraqis, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at Al.
(Camp Bucca is located outside of Basra in southern Iraq). Smith and Salman report that there were
only 5500 iraqis in U.S. custody in August 2004. Yet during the August 2004 to April 2005 period, the
U.S.-Iraqi military board, established to evaluate detainee cases for possible criminal prosecution,
reviewed 9400 cases and released 5300 for insufficient evidence. Another 1600 were turned over for to
the Iraqis for prosecution in Iraqi courts. Thus new arrests of Iraqis by U.S. forces in this nine-month
period have approached 11,500. See id.
39. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir.
2003); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); but see Padilla v. Hanfi, 423 F.3d 386 ( 4 " Cir. 2005).
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the status of suspected terrorists and to try unlawful combatants for war crimes,
and this case is currently pending in the U.S. Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari.4 °
In all three countries, a proffered rationalization for the extra-judicial
treatment of suspected terrorists has been that administrative detention, inhuman
treatment and even torture are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. The
high courts of all three countries ultimately have rejected the most wide-sweeping
security-based justifications for arbitrary treatment. However, unlike its U.K. and
Israeli counterparts, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited its analysis to the issue of
judicial review of detention without charge. The Court has yet to take on the
charge of torture and inhuman treatment by U.S. officials in the war on terror,4 1 as
well as the question of whether military commissions are competent tribunals to try
suspected war criminals under U.S. and international law.42 Moral outrage and
vocal activism on the part of the press, human rights advocates and the public are
essential if the practice of inhuman treatment is to end in the U.S.-led war on
terror.
At the core of understanding and challenging arbitrary and inhuman treatment
by states in response to terrorism is the need to question the unfounded popular

40. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. 622 (Mem.) (2005).
41. On March 1, 2005, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the New York-based
Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights) filed a lawsuit in U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois suing U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on
behalf of torture victims. See Matthew Rothschild, Stripping Rumsfeld and Bush of Impunity, THE
at
available
2005,
July,
PROGRESSIVE,
http://progressive.org/mag-impunity?PHPSESSID=f978da2c302f3 Ie2466378bc230e43b3.
In October 2003, the ACLU had filed a lawsuit seeking information regarding the treatment of
detainees in U.S. custody and renditions to third countries. On May 4, 2005, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York ordered the United States to produce additional photographs
depicting the abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib. See Larry Neumeister, Judge: Public Have Right to See
Abuse Photos, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 26, 2005. Recently the ACLU received 300 new
documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Previously, the FBI had released 30,000
documents in the ACLU lawsuit. Neil A. Lewis, Documents Say Detainees CitedAbuse of Koran, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2005, at Al.
Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia did take on a habeas challenge
to the Guantanamo Bay inmates' conditions of detention in Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311 (D.D.C.
2005). Judge Leon held that while the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241, may provide a mechanism to
challenge the legality of their detention, it does not provide a basis for challenging the conditions of
their detention. Id. at 324-25. Judge Leon went on to find that habeas relief is similarly unavailable for
claims of violations against the Convention Against Torture and other treaties prohibiting torture. Id. at
327. See also CAT, supra note 18. Subsequent legal challenges filed by Guantanamo Bay detainees
will be affected by new amendments to the habeas statute enacted in January 2006 through Public Law
109-163. See supra note 10.
42. Compare In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp. 2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 2005), with
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. 622 (Mem.) (2005).
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wisdom that torture stops terror. Defeating the logic that targeted instances of
"strong arming" or brutality will somehow prevent greater acts of brutality is one
place to start.
It is illuminating to recognize that even as individual public officials,
members of the public, judges, and advocates denounce the inhuman treatment of
detainees on constitutional and human rights grounds, paired with this principled
rejection of state lawlessness has been the pragmatic realization that such
lawlessness does not serve the ends it seeks. Military intelligence experts have
recognized that torture - including subjecting individuals under questioning to
"stress," beatings, and humiliation - may perversely result in bad intelligence
given to bring an end to painful interrogation sessions.43
If we understand that torture is unlikely to prevent future acts of terrorism because of the unreliable nature of torture-induced confessions, we must also
consider the possibility that torture will engender future acts of terrorism. In his
investigation of the role of torture in Egyptian prisons in socializing violent
extremists, journalist Owen Bowcott interviewed an Egyptian psychiatrist who
treated victims of violence. Dr. Fayad concluded that "[t]orturing radical Islamists
makes them more violent .... It's torture that makes them more violent." 44 This
tendency of torture to fuel more terror must be considered in the context of
contemporary Iraq, where the level of suicide attacks has steadily increased since
the beginning of the U.S.-led war and occupation. In May 2005 alone car
bombings outstripped such attacks in all of 2004.45

43. Army Colonel Stuart Herrington, a U.S. interrogator in the Vietnam War and Desert Storm in
Iraq, was interviewed by Anne Applebaum of The Washington Post in Jan. of 2005: "Aside from its
immorality and its illegality, says Herrington, torture is simply 'not a good way to get information.' ...
[N]ine out of 10 people can be persuaded to talk with no 'stress methods' at all." Asked about those
who are beaten to encourage the sharing of information, Herrington asserted: "They'll just tell you
anything to get you to stop." Anne Applebaum, The Torture Myth, WASH POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at A2 1.
See also James Glanz, Torture is Often a Temptation and Almost Never Works, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2004, at 5. (quoting Michael Baker, 16-year CIA veteran and chief executive of Diligence Middle East,
a private security company working in Iraq: "once the prisoner is being tortured, how do you rely on
what he's saying, because people will do anything to make the torture go away"). See also Mayer,
supra note II at 34 (in an interview, David Brant, former head of the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service, stated he "doubted the reliability of forced confessions"). But see Alan Dershowitz, WHY
TERRORISM WORKS 137-39 (Yale University Press 2002) (arguing that torture is sometimes
effective in preventing major acts of terrorism and therefore must remain "on the agenda").
As early as 1936, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated coerced confessions as inherently
unreliable as well as violative of due process. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 283 (in a case
challenging confessions made after brutal beatings, the Supreme Court held that "[t]here was thus
enough before the court when these confessions were first offered to make known ... that they were not
...free and voluntary ....
Id. at 285-86 ([t]he rack and the torture chamber may not be substituted
for the witness stand ... the use of the confessions thus obtained was a clear denial of due process.").
44. Owen Bowcott, Torture Trailto September 11, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 2003, at 19.
45. In Iraq close to 700 people were killed in car bombings, shootings and beheadings during the
month of May 2005. See Jeffrey Fleishman, Risk of Civil War Spreads Fear Across Nation, L.A.
TIMES, May 29, 2005, at A8. While Iraqis experienced 25 car bombings in all of 2004, there were 21
car bombings in Iraq between May I and May 19, 2005 alone. See John F. Bums & Eric Schmitt,
GeneralsOffer a Sober Outlook on Iraqi War, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at Al.
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If states engage in torture as a purported means of preventing terror, irony
aside, revealing the misplaced utilitarian justifications for such conduct is an
essential component of both understanding and challenging the arbitrary treatment
and mistreatment of detainees in the war on terror.46 Similarly, understanding the
rationale for torture in the name of counter-terror enables us to more fully analyze
the different ways in which states practice torture, while officially recognizing its
prohibition.
B. How States Honor the Norm Against Torture in the Breach
Three principal ways in which states denounce torture but practice it
nevertheless are: (1) straight denial that torture occurs; 47 (2) the scape-goating of
so-called "bad apples" who are deemed to practice torture outside their official
capacity and authority; 48 and (3) narrowing the definition of torture such that acts
of torture are deemed not to constitute torture. It is the third avoidance mechanism
that this article will delve into most fully. Narrowing the internationally
recognized definition of torture was the official approach taken by the U.S.
government from 2002 until December 2004. This strategy is reflected in a
46. We should also consider that inhuman treatment and torture may be calculated to instill fear in
the detainee population and their communities on the outside, and as such, this arbitrary treatment may
be tragically effective. If this rationale is central to the practice of torture, then truly we have a
phenomenon of terrorization in the name of counter-terrorism. Yet regardless of intent, the fear and
anger instilled by such torture and counter-terror seem to be fueling increasing levels of violence
against civilians. See Bowcott, supra note 44.
As food for further thought and analysis, it might be suggested that torture and inhuman treatment,
whether institutionalized or practiced in more isolated instances, are more than all-too-common tools of
repressive or authoritarian states. Torture is also an inherent dimension of armed conflict itself, planned
or not, and whether carried out by governments, insurgents or non-state agents. As the brutal treatment
of detainees in Abu Ghraib, Iraq and Bagram, Afghanistan attests, brutality and torture are the
symptoms and poisonous fruit of misbegotten wars of insurgency, counter-insurgency and occupation.
47. Saudi Arabia, Peru and Egypt are examples of states that officially deny the practice of torture,
despite documentation by human rights monitors that it occurs. See Human Rights Watch, supra notes
19 and 20 (regarding Saudi Arabia and Peru). See also Bowcott, supra note 43. ("[l]ast November
[2002], Egypt was again condemned by the UN's influential [C]ommittee [A]gainst [Tiorture in
Geneva. The [C]ommittee concluded that there was 'widespread evidence of torture and ill-treatment in
administrative premises' under control of the SSI [State Security Investigative Unit] ... [t]he Egyptian
government denies that torture takes place systematically in its detention centres and prisons"). Id.
48. The U.S. response to early allegations of abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib detention center,
Iraq, fits the pattern of acknowledging individual instances of torture, but characterizing them as
exceptional and occurring without authorization by supervisors in the chain of command. See Thom
Shanker & Dexter Filkens, Army PunishesSeven with ReprimandsforPrisonAbuse, N.Y. TIMES,, May
4, 2004, at Al, 6 ("... President Bush... telephoned Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld 'to make
sure that appropriate action was being taken against those responsible for these shameful, appalling
acts,' said Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman.... But military officers have said there was
no excuse for the behavior documented in photographs now circling the globe. All Army personnel...
receive courses on the laws of armed conflict that include clear instructions against such abuse and
torture, and these officers say that common human decency should have prevented the soldiers from
such actions.").
Human Rights Watch has criticized the United States for the climate of impunity in responding to
evidence of torture in U.S. facilities around the world. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 21 at I
(stating that in the face of widespread evidence of torture in U.S. facilities overseas, "the only
wrongdoers being brought to justice are those at the bottom of the chain-of-command").
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Department of Justice memorandum issued on August 1, 2002, which will be
analyzed in light of the definition of torture under international law.
1. Torture and Inhuman Treatment Defined under International Law
As provided in Article 1 of the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT),49 torture is severe
pain or suffering, physical or psychological in nature, which is inflicted upon an
individual for such purposes as obtaining a confession, punishing him or her,
influencing third parties, or for discriminatory reasons. 50 There is no specific
intent requirement in the Convention Torture that the torturer intended to cause
such suffering. 51 The intent required is the purpose to derive intelligence, otherwise
influence behavior of the victim or others, or to discriminate. 2 Moreover, under
the CAT, the norm against torture is absolute, as is clarified in the second clause of
Article 2, which holds that "[n]o exception circumstance whatsoever, whether a
or any other public
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability
53
emergency may be invoked as a justification of torture.
Inhuman treatment is not specifically defined in the CAT, although it is
referenced specifically in Article 16, which requires that parties to the treaty
"undertake to prevent ... other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to torture. 54 Nearly twenty years prior to the
adoption of the CAT, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) codified the absolute prohibition against torture and inhuman treatment in
1966." 5 However, the distinction between torture and inhuman treatment is not
clearly made, either in the text of the CAT or in the ICCPR.
Alberto Mora, former General Counsel for the U.S. Navy, argues that torture
and inhuman treatment are equally abhorrent. He concludes that "the right to be
all human beings . . . even those designated as
free of cruelty . . . applies to
'unlawful enemy combatants. ' - 56

49. See CAT, supra note 18.
50. See id. at art. 1(1).
51. See id.
52. See id.

53. Id. at art. 2(2).
54. Id. at art. 16(1). Article 16 also states: "[t]he provisions of this Convention are without
prejudice to the provisions of any other international instrument or national law which prohibits cruel,
... One of these instruments is the International
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which provides in Article 7 that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
55. See ICCPR, supra note 54, at art. 4, 7. Article 4 of the ICCPR provides that Article 7 (the
norm against torture and inhuman treatment) is non-derogable, even in time of national emergency. Id.,
art. 4.

56. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 35 (Mora stated that there is "no moral or practical distinction"
between torture and cruel or inhuman treatment. "If cruelty is no longer unlawful . . . it alters the
fundamental relationship of man to government"). From 2002-03, Navy General Counsel Mora sought
to quash military policies permitting the use of aggressive interrogation techniques. His struggle to
impose legal limits on U.S. policy and practice is explored in Mayer's account. Id. at 32-41.
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Scholars need to flesh out the relationship between torture and inhuman
treatment, so that the lack of clarity does not lead to a watering down of protection
against all forms of inhuman treatment. To begin with, we must reject the idea that
torture is a kind of "aggravated inhuman treatment." Inhuman treatment is already
"aggravated" behavior, reflected in its absolute prohibition. 57 What makes torture
a distinct subset of inhuman treatment is not the degree of suffering on the part of
the victim but the purpose for which the torturer imposes the suffering: to get
information from or to punish the victim, or to otherwise coerce certain behavior.5 8
Unlike torture in this respect, inhuman treatment need not be goal-oriented - it is
the imposition of suffering without regard for deriving information or a confession
or other purpose. Nevertheless, the suffering it causes may be of the same
magnitude as torture, and hence it is equally forbidden.5 9
2. U.S. Policy on Torture in 2002
On August 1, 2002, based on a request by then White House Counsel, now
U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, the Office of Legal Counsel of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a memorandum on "Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation," to define the scope of detainee interrogations in the war on terror.
The 2002 DOJ document departed from the language and spirit of the CAT in three
regards. To begin with, DOJ narrowed the definition of torture, by limiting it to
the infliction of "pain that is difficult to endure, equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
function, or even death., 60 As demonstrated in the previous section, and contrary
to the 2002 DOJ memorandum, torture under international law entails severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or psychological. 6' Torture cannot be limited to the
degree of suffering associated with organ failure, given that psychic pain or mental
suffering is explicitly within the definition. Moreover, given the intelligencedriven element of the CAT definition, it would be irrational to exclude
psychological torture. Torture is defined as abuse that seeks to influence behavior,
and psychic abuse is a powerful motivator. 62

57. See ICCPR, at arts. 4 and 7, supra note 54.; see CAT, supra note 18, at art. 16. See also
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3,213 U.N.T.S.
222, (enteredinto force Sept. 3. 1953) (prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment);
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673, (entered into
force July 18, 1978) (prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment); Organization of African Unity: Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27,
1981, art. 5, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986)
(prohibition against slavery, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment).
58. See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 1(1).
59. See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 16; See ICCPR, supra note 54, at art. 4, 7.
60. Bybee, supra note 1, at 1.
In analyzing U.S. obligations under the U.S. Anti-Torture Statute, Mr. Bybee concluded that "the
statute, taken as a whole, makes plain that it prohibits only extreme acts." Id.
61. See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 1(1).
62. See id. ("pain or suffering ... inflicted for such purposes as obtaining ... information or a
confession ....).
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Second, the DOJ memo held that to violate U.S. law, "severe pain and
suffering must be inflicted with specific intent," and further that such "specific
63
The
intent to inflict severe pain ...must be the defendant's precise objective.,
specific intent requirement is also a corruption of our modem understanding of
torture under international law. The CAT recognizes that torturers may or may not
intend their victims to suffer. What they do intend is to compel them to give
information or to otherwise influence their behavior or the behavior of others close
to them. 64
Finally, the DOJ memorandum asserts that the President may authorize
interrogations that involve torture pursuant to his authority as Commander in
Chief, and hence that "the Department of Justice could not enforce [the AntiTorture Statute] against federal officials acting pursuant to the President's
'65
A Commander in Chief
constitutional authority to wage a military campaign.
exception to the norm against torture renders it an empty promise, given states'
66
tendency to rationalize torture for reasons of national security. Moreover, such
an exception is contrary to the explicit terms of the CAT, which specific that
67
neither war nor public emergency may justify torture.
The U.S. Justice Department has since retracted the first two of the three
principal elements of its August 2002 policy on torture, and qualified the third,
largely in response to public outcry over widespread evidence of the torture of
detainees by U.S. personnel in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Moreover, in January
2006, the U.S. Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act, mandating humane
treatment for all detainees in U.S. custody consistent with U.S. constitutional and
international human rights standards. 68 The revised DOJ policy and the so-called
"McCain Amendment" will be considered further in Section IV.C, after an
exploration of a range of legal and moral arguments against torture. Treaty
provisions, courts, writers and advocates reject the practice of torture. But
international law and community activism have had little impact on the reality of
torture on the ground. The monumental task of reaffirming the human rights of all
those implicated in the war on terror remains.
IV. A

RENEWED CALL FOR HUMANE TREATMENT IN THE WAR ON TERROR

In reasserting and strengthening the international commitment to humane
treatment and protection against torture for all detainees in the war on terror, two
powerful arguments emerge, both woven from strands of humanity as well as
enlightened self-interest. The first is rooted in respect for the inherent dignity of
all human beings, including terrorists, and embraces the very real possibility that
suspected terrorists include individuals with no involvement in acts of violence
whatsoever. 69 The second argument recognizes that human rights protections for
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Bybee, supra note 1, at 3.
See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 1(1).
Bybee, supra note 1, at 36.
See Bybee supra note 1, at Pt. 11 (A), 20-23.
See CAT, supra note 18, at art. 2(2).
Public Law 109-163, § 1403, supra n. 10.
According to defense counsel representing Guantanamo Bay detainees, Defense Department
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suspected terrorists will help restore faith in the rule of law in all situations,
including those of conflict, terror and insecurity. Fidelity in practice to the rule of
law on the part of the most powerful countries will help demonstrate the integrity
and moral content of constitutional democracy, while helping to ensure that
reciprocal protections are accorded prisoners of war and civilian detainees of all
nationalities throughout the world.
From this perspective, we must now give greater substance and definition to
the norms of humane treatment for detainees. Despite the reality of abuse, the
practice of torture remains condemned in law as well as popular culture. What
follows then is an exploration and cataloging of international treaty provisions,
social commentary and human rights advocacy demanding humane treatment for
detainees in the war on terror.
A. Protections Against Torture Established in International Human Rights
and HumanitarianLaw
The five principal international instruments that prohibit torture and inhuman
treatment in all circumstances are the Convention Against Torture (the CAT),7 ° the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,71 the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 72 the Geneva Conventions of 194973 and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).74 As explored in section III B (i), Article 1 of
the CAT defines torture as the infliction of physical or psychological suffering on
an individual, often for purposes of extracting a confession, and Article 2 prohibits
such treatment in absolute terms. 75 The 1966 Civil and Political Covenant, ratified
by the United States in 1994, reinforces the CAT's prohibitions against torture and
inhuman treatment, as basic and non-derogable human rights linked to other civil
rights such as the rights to life, physical security and freedom of expression. 76 The
Universal Declaration unanimously approved by the U.N. General Assembly in
194817 prohibits torture and recognizes the fundamental right of individuals to
humane treatment among a broad range of both civil/political and economic/social
rights including the provision of social security.7 8 The Geneva Conventions
protect combatants and non-combatants alike in a variety of situations: wounded

documents indicate that less than half the detained population is alleged to have committed hostile acts
against the United States, and only 8% are believed to be al Qaeda members. Warren Hoge,
Investigatorsfor U.N. Urge U.S. to Close Guantanamo,N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006 at A6.
70. See CAT, supra note 18.
71. See ICCPR, supra note 54.
72. See Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (Ill), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
73. See generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17.
74. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signatureJuly 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
75. See CAT, supranote 18 at arts. 1-2.
76. ICCPR, supra note 54, at art. 6 (1), 7, 9(1), 19 (2).
77. ROBERT B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 1I(Little, Brown and Company 1995).
78. See UDHR, supra note 72, at arts. 2-27.
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79
soldiers and sailors are protected by the First and Second Geneva Conventions,
prisoners of war protected by the Third, 8° and civilians are protected by the
Fourth. 8' Finally, the Rome Statue of the ICC defines torture as a war crime and a
crime against humanity.82 Because of their applicability to international armed
conflict situations, Geneva Convention protections for various types of detainees
are worthy of further analysis.

1. Geneva Convention Protections for POWs
The Third Geneva Convention has been a subject of great controversy in light
of the uncertain status of so-called "unlawful," "enemy" or "irregular combatants,"
including suspected terrorists. This treaty is regarded to grant privileged status to
prisoners of war who are accorded special rights relating to interrogation,
correspondence and access to the International Committee of the Red Cross
[ICRC]. 83 Most importantly, the Third Geneva Convention requires the humane
treatment of prisoners of war [POWs].84 Nevertheless, the treaty is perhaps more
notable for the rights it accords the detaining state than those it accords prisoners,
particularly the state's privilege to detain POWs without charge up until the
cessation of hostilities." Such prolonged imprisonment in peacetime would be
regarded as arbitrary and unlawful imprisonment under both international human
rights law and the U.S. Constitution.86
The United States Department of Justice and Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales have taken the position that the Third Geneva Convention does not apply
to Taliban or al Qaeda members, because they do not represent the national army87
of a state, wear uniforms or identifying insignia, or submit to the laws of war.
Written in his former capacity as White House Counsel, Gonzales' January 2002
memorandum to the President specifically referenced the Third Geneva
Convention provisions defining the scope of POW status.88 What is perplexing

79. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31[hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
Geneva Convention Relative for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II].
80. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Il].
81. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17.
82. Torture is defined as a crime against humanity when "committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population." See Rome Statute, supra note 70, at art.
7(l)(f). Torture is also defined as a war crime and a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. See id. at
art. 8(2)(a)(ii).
83. See id. at arts. 9, 17 (POWs under questioning may only be required to provide name, rank,
date of birth and serial number), 71 (correspondence), 125 (ICRC access to POWs).
84. Id. at art. 13 ("[p]risoners of war must at all times be humanely treated.")
85. Id. at arts. 21 (detaining power may intern POWs), 118 (POWs "shall be released and
repatriated without delay at the cessation of hostilities.").
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also ICCPR, supra note 54, atart. 9 (no deprivation of liberty
without notice of charges and guarantee of "trial within a reasonable time or...release").
87. Gonzales, supra note 1, at 2.
88. See id. See also Geneva Convention III, supra note 80, at art. 4 (POWs include "[m]embers of
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about Gonzales' position is its relevance to the treatment of Guantanamo Bay
detainees, who have not been judicially determined to be members of either
organization, let alone irregular combatants ineligible for POW status, despite the
Bush administration's
executive determination that they are "unlawful enemy
89
combatants."
Under the Third Geneva Convention, individuals apprehended in the theatre
of war are presumed to be POWs, until a contrary determination by a competent
judicial tribunal. 90 Indeed, the United States began organizing military hearings to
review the "unlawful combatant" designation of Guantanamo Bay detainees in July
2004 subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling in Rasul that they were entitled to
challenge their status in court. 9' However, while 558 such status review panels had
been convened as of May 2005,92 U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens Green
determined in January 2005 that these tribunals violate both U.S. and international
law,93 because they do not accord Constitutional due process,94 nor are they
"competent tribunals" as required by the Third Geneva Convention.
Military law scholars and international jurists continue to debate the issue of
POW status and Third Geneva Convention protections for detainees in the war on
terror. The extensive scholarship of Jordan Paust of the Houston Law Center is
particularly illuminating in this regard.95 But even assuming that certain terror

armed forces . . . [and] [m]embers of other militias . . . including those of organized resistance
movements," who are subject to command responsibility, have "a fixed distinctive sign," carry arms
openly and subject themselves to "the laws and customs of war.").
89. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 589; Padilla, 352 F.3d at 713; Rasul, 542 U.S. at 555. But see Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4"h Cir. 2005) (certiorari petition pending). Gonzales argued in his 2002
memorandum that the non-application of the Third Geneva Convention would "substantially reduce the
threat of domestic criminal prosecution under the [U.S.] War Crimes Act." See Gonzales Memo, supra
note 1, at 2. This is a perplexing argument as well, given that 18 U.S.C. § 2441 defines "war crimes" to
include both grave breaches of any of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and all violations of common
Article 3, which is found in all four Geneva Conventions, and prohibits all "outrages upon personal
dignity." 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(l)-(3) (2005); Gonzales Memo, supra note I at 2; Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 17, at art. 3(c). See also Khalid, 355 F.Supp.2d at 326 (where despite denying habeas
relief to the Guantanamo Bay detainees, Judge Leon recognized the application of the War Crimes Act
to all four Geneva Conventions.) The non-applicability of the Third Geneva Convention would not bar,
and indeed would trigger, the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
90. Geneva Convention III, supra note 80, at art. 5 ("persons, having committed a belligerent act
and [falling] into the hands of the enemy ... enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.").
91. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 at 563. See also Neil A. Lewis, U.S. is Readying Review for
Detainees in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2004, at A10.
92. See Paisley Dodds, Records Reveal Guantanamo Stories, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 23,
2005, availableat http://abcnews.go.com/lntemational/wireStory?id=781536.
93. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d at 481 ("CSRT [Combatant Status
Review Tribunal] procedures are unconstitutional for failing to comport with the requirements of due
process. Additionally, the Court holds that Taliban fighters who have not specifically been determined
to be excluded from prisoner of war status ... have also stated valid claims under the Third Geneva
Convention.").
94. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 80, at art. 5. But see Hamdan 415 F.3d at 42-43
(certiorari petition granted, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 622 (Mem.) Nov. 7, 2005).
95. See generally, Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
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detainees do not merit POW status, they are then relegated to civilian status, and
the occupying power loses the privilege to detain them without charge pending
cessation of hostilities. 96 It is this aspect of the U.S. position as to the non-POW
status of terror detainees that is not only perplexing but seemingly against the U.S.
goal of long-term detention.
2. Geneva Convention Protections for Civilians
If the United States deems that individuals apprehended in Iraq and
Afghanistan are irregular combatants, and for that reason not entitled to POW
status under the Third Geneva Convention, some other legal justification must be
provided for their encampment. As civilians they then fall under the protective
ambit of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which regulates the treatment of
civilians who find themselves under occupation, in this case by the United States.
The most rational basis for the detention of non-POWs by an occupying
power would appear to be that they are civilians suspected of involvement in
criminal conduct, including acts of terrorism. But then by the terms of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, they must be charged with war crimes or released.98 Indeed
this view is fully consistent with Justice Scalia's dissent in Hamdi, in which he
concluded that "[a]bsent suspension of the writ [of habeas corpus], a citizen held
where the courts are open is entitled either to criminal trial or to a judicial decree
requiring his release." 99 The ongoing detention without criminal charges of 540
terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay is hence prohibited by the Fourth Geneva
Convention, as is the U.S. detention without charge and without POW status of
individuals in Iraqi and Afghan jails.1 00

Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503 (2003); Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/ll Overreactionand
FallaciesRegarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, JudicialReview
of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1335 (2004).
Professor Paust cautions against withholding POW status from members of the armed forces of a party
to a conflict on the basis that they are "unlawful combatants," given that such action may have negative
repercussions for U.S. military personnel serving abroad. See id. at 1352. Colonel Kenneth W. Watkin,
of the Office of the Canadian Judge Advocate General, takes a similar view. See Colonel Kenneth W.
Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflicts in the 21' Century, I [SR. DEF. FORCES
L. REv. 69, 83-84 (2003). ("It has been noted that the decision to exclude a group from attaining
combatant status should not be taken lightly .... There is also a very real danger it could result in a
reciprocal denial of POW status to captured personnel.")
96. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 80, at art. 21.
97. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17.
98. See id. at arts. 79 (general prohibition against internment of civilian persons), 42 (internment
only if "security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary"), 68 (duration of internment for
commission of offence must be "proportionate to the offense committed"), 78 (internment only "for
imperative reasons of security").
99. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 572, 124 S. Ct at 2670 (Padilla, who disputes his status as an enemy
combatant, should be charged with a war crime or released), distinguishing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
45-46 (1942) (it was undisputed that the petitioners in Quirin landed in the U.S. as part of the German
war effort).
100. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 16, at arts. 79, 68. Moreover, violations of the Fourth
Geneva Convention may lead to criminal prosecution under the War Crimes Act, just as Third Geneva
Convention violations would. See also Gonzales, supra note 85; 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) (2003).

2006

PRACTICING WHAT WE PREACH

What is not only perplexing but also insidious about the foregone conclusion
by the Bush administration that Guantanamo Bay detainees are not POWs is that it
encourages another fallacious conclusion. The official U.S. position, boiled down,
seems to be that such detainees have no rights under international law, because
effectively they lack any legal status whatsoever.' 0'
The legally unbounded nature of the detention of terror suspects in
Guantanamo Bay by the United States has been denounced by a wide range of
human rights organizations and jurists, perhaps most eloquently by a member of
the U.K. House of Lords, Johan Steyn, when he delivered the twenty-seventh
annual Mann Lecture on November 25, 2003. "The most powerful democracy,"
Lord Steyn warned, "is detaining hundreds of suspected foot soldiers of the
Taliban in a legal black hole at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, where they
10 2
The U.S.-based Human
await trial on capital charges by military tribunals."'
Rights Watch as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross have
States for purporting to place detainees
similarly spoken out against the United
03
"beyond the law" in Guantanamo.1
The antidote to this specter of legal limbo is the application of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, which picks up right where the Third Geneva Convention
leaves off.'0 4 In addition to the prohibition against detaining civilians without
charge, civilians have a number of additional enumerated rights under this
Convention.
Civilians suspected of crimes may not be forcibly transferred from a territory
currently or formerly occupied by the United States. Transfers of detainees from
Iraq and Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by the United States, a contracting
party to all four Geneva Conventions, is potentially a grave breach of Article 147
of Geneva Convention IV, which prohibits unlawful deportations or transfers of
renditions to third
civilians from occupied territory. 1 5 Article 147 also 0prohibits
6
countries of terror suspects from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Most fundamentally, the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits torture and all
forms of brutality against civilians, whether detained or not, and regardless of
101. Professor Paust rejects the rightless status of any persons under humanitarian law. "Under the
Geneva Conventions, there is no gap in the reach of at least some forms of protection .... Such rights
include the right to be 'treated humanely' [and] freedom from 'cruel treatment and torture' ...."See
Paust, supra note 91, at 1351 (citing Common Article 3 of all four Geneva Conventions).
102. The Mann lecture is given every year under the auspices of the British institute of
International and Comparative Law, in memory of the late British jurist F.A. Mann. See Johan Steyn, A
Monstrous Failureof Justice: Guantanamo, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 27, 2003.
103. United States: Guantanamo, Two Years On, (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 9,
2004, at 3, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/09/usdom6917.htm. See also supra note
21.
104. See Watkin, supra note 91, at 84 (recognizing that irregular combatants who are not accorded
POW status would be protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention).
105. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, at art. 147. See also id. at art. 49 ("individual or mass
forcible transfers ... from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any
other country... are prohibited, regardless of their motive").
106. Id. at art. 147
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whether the basis for their detention is legal. Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention is quite explicit about what conduct toward civilians is prohibited
under all circumstances. Signatories may not "cause the physical suffering or
extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not
only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific
experiments, but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by
civilian or military agents.' ' 7
In 2003 the International Committee of the Red Cross criticized the U.S.
10 8
government for its treatment of detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq,
0
9
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba' and Bagram detention center in Afghanistan." l In
February of 2006, a panel of five independent experts appointed by the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights concluded that torture of detainees was
occurring in Guantanamo Bay,"' at which time U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan called for the closure of the U.S. detention center. 1 2 Moreover, the U.S.
military confirms that of 98 deaths that occurred in U.S. custody in Iraq and
Afghanistan since 2002, 34 are suspected or confirmed homicides. 113 While
abusive conditions in Abu Ghraib, Bagram and Guantanamo violate the Article 32
prohibition against physical suffering, the documented deaths of Habibullah and
Dilawar and others also violate the Article 32 prohibition against extermination.
In conclusion, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibit the arbitrary
detention, arbitrary transfer, torture, abuse and murder of all persons - whether
wounded combatants, irregular combatants, civilians, suspected terrorists or war
criminals - who find themselves in the hands of a belligerent or occupying power.
Regardless of status and place of detention, the Third and Fourth Geneva
4
Conventions forbid the inhuman treatment of POW and civilian detainees alike."1
The humanitarian protections enshrined in the Geneva Conventions are reflected,
reinforced and refined by the protections against torture and abuse set forth in the
CAT, the Civil and Political Covenant, the Universal Declaration and the Rome
Statute of the ICC. Moreover, these treaty-based human rights norms resonate
with popular and scholarly demands for humane treatment of all persons.

107. Id. at art. 32.
108. Douglas Jehl & David Rohde, Afghan Deaths Linked to Unit at Iraq Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2004, at Al (referencing "I.C.R.C. report which said that what Red Cross officials witnessed
during visits to the prison in October [2003] 'included deliberate physical violence,' as well as verbal
abuse, forced nudity and prolonged handcuffing in uncomfortable positions").
109. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 103.
110. See Golden, supra note 15.
111. See Farley, supran. 22.
112. See Edith M. Lederer, Annan Says U.S. Should Close GITMO Prison, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 16, 2006.
113. Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Military says 26 Inmate Deaths May be Homicide, N.Y.
TIMES, March 16, 2005, at Al. See also William Fisher, Death in U.S. Custody, TRUTHOUT, Feb. 26,
2006, available at http://www.truthout.org/docs-2006/022606Y.shtml (of 34 deaths that the military
suspects to be homicides, only 12 have resulted in punishment).
114. See Rome Statute, supra note 74, at art. 13. See also Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, at
art. 32.
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B. RepudiatingTorture in Human Terms
While torture must be understood in legal terms, such technical analysis
should not occur in a vacuum. Legal definitions and analysis often distance us
from the human reality of man's inhumanity to man. Torture, stated simply, is a
painful assault on the body or psyche of a human being. The person who imposes
the pain need not intend cruelty for the suffering experienced by the victim to be
cruel indeed.
In seeking non-legalistic depictions of torture, the writing of Jonathan Schell
115
and Wole Soyinka stand out. Schell, author of The Fate of the Earth, writes
that:
[t]orture is wrong because it inflicts unspeakable pain upon the body of
a fellow human being who is entirely at our mercy. The tortured person
is bound and helpless .... The victim bears no arms, lacking even the
use of the two arms he was bom with. The inequality is total. To abuse
or kill a person in such a116circumstance is as radical a denial of common
humanity as is possible.
While Nigerian Nobel laureate in literature Wole Soyinka has not written
extensively on the issue of torture, he has addressed slavery and other repressive
Slavery, Soyinka writes, is about denial - a
institutions in great depth.
fundamental denial of the humanity of the enslaved.117 While writing about two
related institutions, slavery and apartheid, Soyinka might have been writing about
torture as well. Although 2 0 th century apartheid and pre-20tb century slavery were
de jure systems of racial discrimination and oppression, and torture often entails
individual acts of inhumanity, there is an institutional aspect to torture as well.
When torture occurs in the context of counter-insurgency policy or the war on
terror, at the hands of a government that has ratified the Convention Against
Torture, there is a systemic denial of both the practice of torture and the humanity
and legal personality of the person who is suffering the abuse.
Given the ongoing reality of prisoner abuse, we need to evaluate honestly the
impact of civil society's condemnation of the torture and inhuman treatment of
detainees in the war on terror. There has been some notable public outcry against
the United States' arbitrary and brutal treatment of suspected terrorists detained in
the United States, Cuba, Iraq and Afghanistan. In response to the mounting
evidence of abuses and deaths of detainees in U.S. custody in Iraq and Afghanistan
since 2002,118 human rights groups have called for official investigations into
detention operations 119 Official U.S. policy has already changed regarding the

115. JONATHAN SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (Alfred A. Knopf 1982).
116. Jonathan Schell, What Is Wrong With Torture, THE NATION, Feb. 7, 2005.
117. Wole Soyinka, THE BURDEN OF MEMORY, THE MUSE OF FORGIVENESS 69-71 (Oxford

University Press 1999). "Now what is a denial of humanity? .... Do we wish to dispute that apartheid
South Africa did correspond overwhelmingly to a denial of humanity? The condition of 'slave' is a
denial of the freedom of action, of the freedom of choice." Id. at 70.
118. Jehl & Schmitt, supra note 113. See also Fisher, supra note 113.
119. Jehl & Schmitt. supra note 113..
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definition of torture, 120 but neither the administration nor the courts have yet held
individual U.S. officials to account. Whether the widespread practice of arbitrary
treatment, brutality and torture will stop remains to be seen.
C. Human Rights Advocacy and Evolving U.S. Policy on the Treatment of
Detainees in the War on Terror
In a December 30, 2004 memorandum that responded to public outcry over
the torture of Iraqi detainees by U.S. military police and intelligence officers in
Abu Ghraib prison, the DOJ retracted two elements of its earlier August 2002
torture memo. 12 1 As of December 2004, DOJ policy now concedes and clarifies
that torture is not limited to the "severe physical pain" associated with organ
failure or death. Moreover, the revised policy no longer requires proof of the
interrogator's specific intent to cause the detainee to experience harm, suffering or
pain.122 Finally, with regard to the DOJ-asserted presidential authority to authorize
torture in certain circumstances, the recent policy directive only states that the
Justice Department need not address
this issue, because the President has
23
expressed no present intent to do so.1

The December 2004 DOJ memorandum was belated and fell far short of an
acknowledgment, rejection of, or apology for the brutal treatment of individuals
apprehended and detained in the war on terror. The current policy also leaves a
dangerous loophole for presidential authorization of torture.
In part to address such gaps, in 2005 Senator John McCain of Arizona
introduced legislation prohibiting torture and inhumane treatment of all detainees
in U.S custody throughout the world. 24 With his support and negotiating skills,
this amendment was enacted into law and signed by President Bush. Nevertheless,
in a signing statement promulgated on December 30, 2005, the President reasserted
a zone of executive discretion, clarifying that "[t]he executive branch shall
construe . .

.

[the detainee provisions] in a manner consistent with the

constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive and as
Commander in Chief. . . which
will assist in... protecting the American people
125
from further terrorist attacks."'

120. Compare Bybee, supranote 1, at pt. 1iB, 20-23, with Levin memorandum, supra note 122.
121. See id.
122. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Spells Out New Definition Curbing Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at
AI; see also supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
123. While the December 30, 2004 memorandum expresses that "[tIorture is abhorrent both to
American law and values and to international norms," it does not explicitly deny the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief to broaden the scope of interrogations in the war on terror if deemed
necessary. Nevertheless, the memo does state that "such authority would be inconsistent with the
president's unequivocal directive that United States personnel not engage in torture." Lewis, supra note
116; Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to James B. Comey, Deputy
Attorney General, Re: Legal StandardsApplicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) at
1-2, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf, see also supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
124. Public Law 109-163, supra n. 10, § 1403 (defining humane treatment in terms of the U.S.
Constitution and the Convention Against Torture).
125. Statement of President Bush on the signing of H.R. 2863 (Dec. 30, 2005) available at
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26
Coupled with the recent Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi and Rasul,1 the
McCain Amendment and the Justice Department's recanting of its unprincipled
narrowing of the norm against torture appear to represent positive steps towards
the reestablishment of the rule of law in the U.S.-led war on terror. Yet despite
recent changes in official U.S. policy on torture, throughout 2005 and early 2006
there have been increased reports of widespread torture and abuse in U.S. detention
facilities worldwide without any accountability at the highest levels of
government. 127
In April of 2005, Human Rights Watch spoke out most vehemently against
torture and homicide by U.S. officials in U.S. facilities overseas:

It has now been one year since the appearance of the first pictures of U.S.
soldiers humiliating and torturing detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq .... In
the intervening months, it has become clear that torture and abuse have taken place
not solely at Abu Ghraib but rather in dozens of U.S. detention facilities
worldwide, that in many cases the abuse resulted in death or severe trauma, and
that a good number of the victims were civilians with no connection to al-Qaeda or
terrorism. There is also evidence of abuse at U.S.-controlled "secret locations"
to third-country dungeons around
abroad and of U.S. authorities sending suspects
128
occur.
to
likely
was
torture
where
the world
Human Rights Watch concludes that Secretary Rumsfeld in particular
"approved interrogation methods that violated the Geneva Conventions and the
Convention Against Torture.129
In May of 2005, the London-based and Washington-based offices of Amnesty
International (Al) issued simultaneous press releases launching Al's annual report
for 2005. Irene Kahn, Al's Secretary General, condemned the U.S. detention
center in Guantanamo Bay as "the gulag of our times." William Schultz,
Executive Director of Al USA called for an independent investigation:
It's far past time for President Bush to prove that he is not covering up the
misdeed of senior officials and political cronies who designed and authorized these
nefarious interrogation policies. So Congress must appoint a truly impartial and
independent commission to investigate the masterminds of the atrocious human
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html.
126. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 601; see also Rasul 542 U.S. at 563.
127. An investigation on the conduct of U.S. interrogations in Iraq and Afghanistan was concluded
in March 2005 by Naval Inspector General and Vice Admiral Albert T. Church. The Church report
criticized senior U.S. officials for failing to articulate clear interrogation guidelines, but concluded that
U.S. policy did not approve of detainee abuse and that Pentagon and other senior officials were not
directly responsible for such abuses. See Eric Schmitt, New Interrogation Rules Set for Detainees in
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at Al. See also Taguba report, supra note 11.
More recently, when U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and five U.N.-appointed experts
concluded that the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay should be closed in light of ongoing
torture of detainees, White House spokesman Scott McClellan asserted that the U.S. military treated
detainees humanely. He then cautioned "[t]hese are dangerous terrorist that we are talking about who
are there." Hoge, supra note 69.
128. Human Rights Watch, supranote 22, at 1.
129. Id. at 32.
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rights violations at Abu Ghraib and other detention centers, 30and President Bush
should use the power of his office to press Congress to do so.'
Also writing in 2005, international law scholar Jordan Paust concludes with
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International that Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld approved illegal interrogation methods in Guantanamo Bay, which
subsequently helped dictate interrogation practices in Iraq. Professor Paust places
Rumsfeld's misconduct in the context of a broader plan to circumvent international
law, and specifically condemns President Bush for refusing to accord the
protections of humanitarian law to individuals suspected of involvement in
terrorism:
I know of no other instance in the long history of the United States of a plan
approved by lawyers and at the highest levels of our government systematically to
deny human beings protections under the laws of war. I know of no other denial
by a President of the United States of the fact that the laws of war apply to an
international armed conflict during which U.S. armed forces engage an enemy in
battle. I know of no other authorization of a President to deny treatment required
under the Geneva Conventions. I know of no other instance in our history when a
Secretary of Defense... approved such denials of protection or the use of
interrogation tactics that were either patently violative of the laws of war or could
13
clearly constitute violations in various circumstances. '
Spurred on by the outrage of leading human rights organizations and scholars,
will the American people demand that our government stop the torture and
inhuman treatment of detainees in the war on terror? To end such practices, our
moral and legal compasses must first call us to action.
V. CONCLUSION

As scholars, advocates, jurists and citizens, we have failed so far to protect
suspected terrorists from abuses by U.S. officials. Our country is shamed. In our
struggle to restore to ourselves and to our society some measure of legality and
dignity, we must begin by affirming the humanity and dignity of those implicated
in terrorist attacks as well as those targeted by terrorist violence. We must reject
the claims that international treaties cease to apply in the context of terrorism. Far
from becoming outmoded, "obsolete" or "quaint,'1 32 the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, human rights principles and
Constitutional guarantees of due process have only grown in relevance and power
since, as a nation, we first confronted large-scale terrorist violence on our own soil.

130. Alan Cowell, U.S. 'Thumbs Its Nose' at Rights, Amnesty Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2005, at
AI0.
131. See Paust, supra note 12 at 862-63; See also id. at 847 ("Major General Miller brought the
Rumsfeld April 16, 2003 list of tactics to Iraq and gave them to the Commander of the Joint Task
Force-7, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez").
132. Gonzales, supra note 1, at 1 (alleging that particular provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention do not apply to the war on terror).
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If we abandon the rule of law in the "war on terror," we risk becoming what
we fear. 133 Ultimately it is our responsibility as moral actors to clarify for our
government the rights of all counter-terror detainees, and to demand that these
rights are respected. Torture imposes severe suffering on the body or psyche of the
34
victim, but torture need not entail a specific intent to cause such suffering.'
Torture is purposeful - it seeks to compel a confession, to punish or to coerce.135
Torture is never justified, even and especially in time of war and insecurity, when
it is most likely to occur, and even when authorized by the President. 36 Like
torture, inhuman treatment is prohibited absolutely, and differs only from torture in
that it may be gratuitous - unconcerned with the gathering of intelligence or
compelling behavior.1 37 Finally, terror suspects are never beyond the pale of the
law: they are protected from inhuman treatment either as POWs under Article 13
of the Third Geneva Convention, 138 or as civilians under Article 32 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, 139 and as human beings in time of both war and peace40 under
Articles 7 and 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1
The Quaker tradition of non-violent social activism requires citizens to "speak
truth to power,"'14 1 and to demand government fidelity to the rule of law. Today,
our government continues to use the threat of more terrorism to justify the unfair
and sometimes horrific treatment of terror detainees. We must expose and reject
the practice of torture, brutality and arbitrary detention in our name. Only by
speaking law to terror, 142 and truth to power, will we begin to restore the legal and
moral foundation of our society and thus to reclaim our democratic traditions.

133. Writing about the abuses of prisoners in Guantanamo, Hendrik Hertzberg writes, "[w]e have
to be respectful of Muslim sensibilities and Muslim beliefs, and the surest way to do that is to be
respectful of our own. Otherwise ...[w]e'll lose sight of what we're fighting for, and little by little,
become the mirror of what we're fighting against." Hendrick Hertzberg, Big News Week, THE NEW
YORKER, May 30, 2005, at 33.
134. CAT, supra note 18, at art. 1(1).
135. Id.
136. Id. at art. 2(2).
137. Id. at arts. 1(1),16; ICCPR, supranote 54, at arts. 4, 7.
138. See Geneva Convention 11, supra note 80.
139. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 17, at 32.
140. See ICCPR, supranote 54.
141. American Friends Service Committee, Speak Truth to Power, PEACEWORK MAG., Dec., 2001Jan. 2002, (This article is based on a document titled Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an
Alternative to Violence, which was prepared in 1955 by the American Friends Service Committee
responding to the Cold war and the nuclear arms race. It explores the Quaker philosophy of nonviolence, and reminds Quakers of their original 1 81hcentury call to bear witness before their leaders to
the terrible consequences of war.),
availableat http://www.afsc.org/pwork/0112/011204.htm.
142. See generally, Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War against Terrorism and
Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. HUM. RTS. 241 (2003) (calling for the application of international human
rights law in the war on terror), available at http://www.ejil.org/joumal/Vol14/No2/art3.pdf.

